



HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER

Presentation of extracts of the Wiltshire Police Investigation into the management and supervision of the Historic Child Abuse Enquiry by the Chief Officer of Police – Mr. G Power.

Finance Report

13 July 2010



HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER

Explanatory Note

This document includes extracts from the disciplinary investigation by Wiltshire Police into the management and supervision of the Historic Child Abuse Enquiry by the Chief Officer of Police, Graham Power. The investigation was conducted for the purpose of disciplinary proceedings. Witnesses interviewed as part of this investigation were not informed that their identities or information provided by them to the investigation Team would be published.

As a consequence, only parts of the original Report are being published.

The text of this Report has been redacted to ensure that, in publishing this Report, due regard is had to the relevant legal principles contained in the Human Rights (Jersey) Law 2000, the Data Protection (Jersey) Law 2005 and other legal duties.

Any police officer referred to in the text is described as Officer X and any other person is described as X. Where other text has been redacted from paragraphs which are otherwise included it is noted by the words "text redacted".

In the interests of transparency the page numbering of the original document has been retained.

Care should be taken with respect to the statistical information contained in this document. It was up to date at the time of its preparation but has not been updated subsequently.

The Minister has reflected on the competing interests of Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights- right to respect for private life and family life and right to freedom of expression respectively.

The Minister considers that individuals should only be named where naming is important to understanding what happened or where that individual's position carries with it the expectation of public accountability. The Minister considers that an individual should not be named if their role is of a junior nature or peripheral to the events being described.

The Minister in deciding which parts of this Report to publish has sought to balance the requirement to be open and transparent with the need to be fair to individuals.

An independent disciplinary investigation by Wiltshire Police following the suspension of Chief Officer Graham POWER of the States of Jersey Police on 12 November 2008.

Obligation to confidentiality

1. Paragraph 1.2 of the discipline code (for Chief Officers of the States of Jersey Police) requires that all parties involved in the operation of this code will maintain confidentiality while proceedings are being progressed. The outcome of any particular case arising under the code will not, as a general rule, be publicised, but it is accepted that following the outcome of a particular case, the Home Affairs Minister and/or the States Employment Board and/or the Chief Officer, might decide that public disclosure is appropriate.
2. This Report contains personal data within the meaning of the Data Protection Act 1998, and Wiltshire Police would breach the first data protection principle if it were to disclose that information. Hence, the information is exempt under s.40(2) Freedom of Information Act 2000.
3. This Report contains information that has been, and continues to be, held by Wiltshire Police for the purposes of an investigation which it has a duty to conduct and which ought not to be disclosed (under s.30 Freedom of Information Act 2000).
4. An obligation of confidence upon Wiltshire Police arises from the duty outlined at 1. above, and disclosure of information would be likely to prejudice relations between the United Kingdom and Jersey. Information, therefore, ought not to be disclosed (under s.27 Freedom of Information Act 2000).

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1. Executive summary

- 1.1 In considering the evidence available to this Inquiry, failings have been identified in the management by Chief Officer Graham POWER of the financial aspects of Operation Rectangle. It is accepted that a Chief Officer would not necessarily have complete oversight of all financial aspects of an investigation; however, his management in this case at both the micro and macro levels of finance was limited and weak. Effectively, CO POWER did too little, too late. Operation Rectangle was probably the largest child abuse investigation in the history of the States of Jersey Police, and the financial outlay was by far the largest ever experienced in a police investigation in the Island. We have found no evidence that CO POWER committed any criminal offence relating to his supervision of Operation Rectangle. However, we conclude that he may be in breach of the Discipline Code for Chief Officers in his failure to meet the performance requirements placed upon him by s.9(3) Police Force (Jersey) Law 1974. These potential breaches are described in Section 4, List of conclusions and recommendations, of this Report.
- 1.2 In his witness statement, CO POWER is unambiguously critical of the introduction of the Accounting Officer role and associated changes since the inception of the Public Finances (Jersey) Law 2005. He foresaw potential difficulties in the removal of finance staff directly under his control. It was his view that he, and not Steven AUSTIN-VAUTIER, the Home Affairs Chief Officer, should have maintained the responsibilities of the Accounting Officer for the States of Jersey Police.
- 1.3 Whilst finance staff were no longer under the direct control of CO POWER, a Finance Manager and Director were among those accessible to him from the Home Affairs Department. x the Finance Manager, and x the Finance Director, were both available to provide advice and guidance to the Chief Officer. The Finance Manager routinely attended police management meetings and reported on the state of all police budgets. Operation Rectangle became an additional budget on which he provided professional comment. Regular updates based upon the information provided

to X by the police were given in both the Executive Strategy Group (ESG) and the Force Management Board (FMB). Being the Chair of both routine management meetings, CO POWER was in regular receipt of data about expenditure levels attributable to Operation Rectangle.

- 1.4 During the course of the Operation Rectangle investigation, the Accounting Officer, Steven AUSTIN-VAUTIER, sought to ensure that expenditure incurred by Operation Rectangle was controlled within the finance directions appertaining to all departmental budgets. In communications between Steven AUSTIN-VAUTIER and CO POWER over this matter, CO POWER made clear that whilst he accepted his responsibilities, he felt he lacked appropriately qualified staff. This, to his credit, led CO POWER to suggest the formation of a Financial Oversight Board (FOB). The Board held its inaugural meeting on 23 July 2008. No evidence of adequate control measures put in place by CO POWER prior to this have been identified by this Inquiry.
- 1.5 Not holding the position of the Accounting Officer and without the direct control of finance staff, CO POWER considered himself unable to provide unequivocal assurances with respect to the expenditure associated with Operation Rectangle. Whilst we conclude that CO POWER failed in his duties in providing effective oversight of Operation Rectangle's expenditure, it is also the view of this Inquiry that the role of the Accounting Officer (with legally binding responsibilities as to how resources are used for a department such as the police, yet with no direct control) is a flawed one. Whilst it could be argued that Steven AUSTIN-VAUTIER could have challenged either DCO Lenny HARPER or CO POWER over the increasing costs of Operation Rectangle, the fact remained that he had no managerial or operational responsibility over them.
- 1.6 We also note that, to his credit, CO POWER did enlist external advice on the overall management of Operation Rectangle from the ACPO Homicide Working Group. However, there was no specific requirement within their terms of reference to review or specifically consider the financial aspects of the investigation.

CO POWER's failings at the macro level of financial oversight

1.7 Emphasis is placed by CO POWER on the role and accountability of the Accounting Officer, Mr AUSTIN-VAUTIER. Whilst the Accounting Officer remains responsible by statute (the Public Finances (Jersey) Law 2005), it is the opinion of this Inquiry that CO POWER, as the only supervisor of DCO HARPER, should have ensured that a proper accounting structure was in place to ensure resources were being used efficiently and effectively. Adequate systems were not put in place by the Chief Officer of Police to ensure necessary and reasonable expenditure.

1.8 Predominantly, CO POWER monitored expenditure attributable to Operation Rectangle through routine police management meetings until the FOB was formed. It is our contention that, had a Gold Group been established, closer scrutiny could have been directed towards the financial oversight of the operation. The lack of a Gold Group is discussed in the *Operation Haven Report* (section 4.10). Prior to the establishment of the Gold Group the SIO, DCO HARPER, was not routinely present at ESG and FMB meetings as the investigation gained momentum after 23 February 2008. We cannot determine the means by which CO POWER held DCO HARPER to account for the very substantial outlay in respect of Operation Rectangle.

1.9 Whilst CO POWER considered the systems imposed upon him to have been poor, it is our contention that he should have developed the means to better control spending. No one other than he could reasonably challenge the SIO over the necessity of expenditure committed to Operation Rectangle. Finance staff were only aware of significant expenditure retrospectively, in some cases weeks after it had been incurred. Only CO POWER could provide effective scrutiny of the planning, efficiency and effectiveness of Operation Rectangle, and this he failed to do.

CO POWER's failings at the micro level of financial oversight

1.10 This Inquiry has concentrated on matters that only the Chief Officer could control. We have considered the findings of a consultant, Mr Mike KELLETT, and the content of a draft version of a consultancy report by BDO Alto. It

should be noted that the final version of the Report was not available prior to the finalisation of this Report. Whilst we concur with many of the draft report's findings, we do not hold CO POWER directly to be 'at fault' in all areas. However, in the case of the expenses of the DCO and associated trips to London, we consider the lack of scrutiny provided by CO POWER to typify his approach to supervision of expenditure on Operation Rectangle. In the case of these trips, again only CO POWER could have supervised DCO HARPER, and it is our contention that this did not occur. Evidence suggests that expenses submitted by the DCO were not signed by CO POWER, in contravention of the Force's Travel and Expenses Policy. Whilst this policy allowed for an officer of a rank below the DCO to sign these off on 'rare' occasions, this Inquiry expresses concern at the regularity of the 'exceptions' over the many months during which the Chief Officer was available to scrutinise and supervise his Deputy's personal use of public money.

- 1.11 Whilst we accept that there was a sound operational rationale for some of the trips to London by the DCO, there is evidence to suggest that the cost of these trips could have been reduced had a more prudent approach been taken. This, we feel, could have been identified by CO POWER, had any form of scrutiny been applied by him to his Deputy's expense claims. In one particular case an officer who was due to retire was invited on a trip to London which he had no need to attend. His stay incurred expense which was wholly inappropriate.
- 1.12 This Inquiry has examined the Travel and Expenses Policy and considers it not to have been routinely complied with. Restaurant receipts were rarely itemised; the cost of alcohol was excessive, as was the necessity for DCO HARPER to have attended so many 'Business' or 'Hospitality' meals. Only CO POWER could supervise his Deputy and it appears he failed to do so.
- 1.13 A further requirement of the Policy was that if non-States of Jersey Officers were present for a meal, their details should be recorded in expense claims unless this was inappropriate for security reasons. We have seen no evidence to suggest that details of those present should not have been recorded. Names were not provided on those forms seen by this Inquiry.

- 1.14 This Inquiry is at pains to point out that we discuss expense claims primarily for the purpose of showing the absence of supervision by CO POWER, across both the macro level (operation-wide) and the micro level (personal), of those aspects of Operation Rectangle which CO POWER had personal responsibility for managing, given that he was the sole supervisor of DCO HARPER.
- 1.15 Finally, we comment on the governance of the Force as part of our obligation to advance proposals for improvement. Within the main *Operation Haven Report*, reference is made to alleged political interference in the operations of the Force. This part of the Inquiry shows confusion existed between the responsibilities of the Accounting Officer and the Chief Officer of Police. In considering both of these factors (alleged interference and confused accountability) this Inquiry suggests that there may be a role for a body akin to a 'Police Authority' to support the States of Jersey and its Force.

2. **The Supervision of financial management in Operation Rectangle
by Chief Officer POWER**

Pages 9 – 89

TEXT REDACTED

3. Independent scrutiny and oversight – a role for a police authority?

- 3.1 This Inquiry suggests that consideration is given to the formation of a Police Authority in Jersey which may help to prevent the recurrence of the problems that arose during the Operation Rectangle investigation.
- 3.2 Operation Haven was not mandated to establish whether or not there was any political interference in the running of the operation but we have accepted that CO POWER *believed* there was and that he sometimes acted according to that belief. We are aware that the concept of a Police Authority has been under consideration by the States of Jersey for some time and that the idea was supported by CO POWER.
- 3.3 This Inquiry has reported that the accountabilities between the Chief Officer and the States appeared confused. We also believe that a Police Authority may have provided a more intrusive approach to the financial and performance oversight of the investigation and the Force more generally.
- 3.4 A Jersey Police Authority equivalent would have had a strategic role, providing oversight to the investigation though not responsible for the day-to-day delivery of the Inquiry. It would have been unlikely to attract the same level of criticism directed at the current arrangements by CO POWER and his supporters.
- 3.5 In respect of financial governance it could have provided clarity, ensuring that a proper accounting structure was in place and that resources were being used efficiently and effectively. CO POWER would therefore be accountable to the Police Authority as the Accounting Officer, as opposed to the situation that currently exists whereby the Accounting Officer has no control over operational expenditure and the Chief Officer does not

consider himself accountable for the expenditure that his Force incurs.

3.6 This Inquiry suggests that a Police Authority may help better co-ordinate at a strategic level the policing strategies of the States and Honorary Police and provide greater transparency to policing activity. In addition, the reporting requirement of the Chief Officer to the Chief Executive to the Council of Ministers on the issue of performance against the policing plan is not ideal.

3.7 On a day to day basis, the current arrangements were adequate for the needs of Jersey but the magnitude of an operation such as Operation Rectangle highlighted the weaknesses in this approach. This Inquiry believes a stronger system would see the Chief Officer accountable to one independent body, comprising a mix of political and independent appointees. We do not advocate change because of a single event, however momentous. Nevertheless, the circumstances of Operation Rectangle are not unique and similar challenges for the States in the future cannot be eliminated. We appreciate that importing one approach from another jurisdiction is seldom a neat fit. We recommend in any event, that a structure is adopted which mitigates the opportunity for allegations of political interference in policing and that the use of resources receives thorough scrutiny and has clear accountabilities. We say no more than a police authority-type approach as part of a tripartite arrangement has been found to be effective elsewhere.

3.8 **Recommendation 2 – The States of Jersey considers adopting a police authority type-approach to ensure the operational independence of the Chief Officer and the effective and efficient use of the resources of the States of Jersey Police.**

4. List of conclusions and recommendations

4.1 Conclusions

- 4.1.1 Conclusion 1 - CO POWER failed to establish efficient and effective oversight of financial expenditure of Operation Rectangle prior to the commencement of the Financial Oversight Board in July 2008.

4.2 Recommendations

- 4.2.1 Recommendation 1 - The States of Jersey clarifies the role of the Accounting Officer and distinguishes it from the role of the Chief Officer, providing adequate advice to both incumbents.
- 4.2.2 Recommendation 2 - The States of Jersey considers adopting a police authority-type approach to ensure the operational independence of the Chief Officer and the effective and efficient use of the resources of the States of Jersey Police.

5. Legal advice in respect of suggested charges

5.1 Suggested charge

5.1.1 As Chief Officer of Police for the States of Jersey Police ("SoJP") you failed, between about September 2007 and November 2008 effectively and efficiently to manage and supervise the Operation Rectangle investigation ("the investigation") into alleged child abuse at Haut de la Garenne ("HDLG") and as a consequence thereof you:

- i. failed to perform your duties to a satisfactory standard;
- ii. behaved in a manner likely to bring discredit to the States of Jersey Police.

5.2 Particulars

- 5.2.1 1.a) The HDLG investigation was a Critical Incident that required strategic management by the Chief Officer of Police, for the following reasons:
- 5.2.2 b) It was the biggest policing operation in Jersey in living memory.
- 5.2.3 c) All allegations of institutional child abuse carry a legitimate and intense public interest and necessarily require effective and efficient management.
- 5.2.4 d) In a small and island community like the States of Jersey (SoJ), such an investigation requires sensitive and intelligent planning and management.
- 5.2.5 e) You knew or ought reasonably to have known of the inevitable political sensitivity of such an investigation because of its potentially negative implications for the reputation of the States of Jersey Police, the SoJ and the

people of Jersey.

- 5.2.6 2. Despite the propositions in (1) above, you failed to appreciate the significance of the investigation from the outset and you failed strategically to manage the investigation, adequately or at all.
- 5.2.7 3. You failed to establish an appropriate strategic steering group for the investigation (whether "Gold Group" or other appropriate local variant) which group ought to have set appropriate strategic parameters, including strategies for:
- 5.2.8 a) Ensuring the investigation was conducted to a high standard;
- 5.2.9 b) Media management;
- 5.2.10 c) Community impact and confidence;
- 5.2.11 d) Financial management.
- 5.2.12 4. In relation to the investigation of Operation Rectangle you failed as follows:
- 5.2.13 a) To appoint a suitably qualified Senior Investigating Officer.
- 5.2.14 b) Properly or at all to supervise the SIO, DCO Lenny HARPER.
- 5.2.15 c) To set or review written terms of reference or any other appropriate parameters for the investigation to cover issues such as forensic strategy, media strategy, investigative strategy and witness management.
- 5.2.16 d) To ensure terms of reference were agreed and adhered to by the SIO, DCO HARPER.
- 5.2.17 e) To keep a policy file on the case; alternatively you did not intrusively monitor that kept by HARPER and failed to maintain adequate records of your own supervision of him.

- 5.2.18 f) To ensure proper and effective liaison with the Attorney General's team of lawyers.
- 5.2.19 g) To ensure the investigation was managed as a multi agency investigation in accordance with accepted guidance.
- 5.2.20 5. In relation to media management you failed as follows:
- 5.2.21 a) To institute or document or regularly review any or any proper strategy for protecting:
- 5.2.22 i. the investigation from prejudicial reporting or inappropriate journalistic activity;
- 5.2.23 ii. potential witnesses and complainants from media intrusion;
- 5.2.24 iii. the reputation of the SoJP and SoJ from inappropriate media coverage;
- 5.2.25 b) By permitting excessive disclosures to the media you ran the dual risks of prompting abuse of process arguments by prospective criminal defendants and undermining the evidential weight to be attached to complainants' allegations.
- 5.2.26 c) To ensure that press statements from Operation Rectangle distinguished between allegation and proven fact, thereby causing or permitting sensationalist and inaccurate media coverage.
- 5.2.27 d) To monitor and thus exercise any or any proper control over DCO HARPER's briefings to the media, thereby causing or permitting the media to publish sensationalist and inaccurate stories in relation to, *inter alia*, "the partial remains of child", "skull fragment", "cellars", "shackles", and "blood in a bath".

- 5.2.28 e) To attempt to correct in a timely manner false or sensationalist media reporting, including in relation to the so-called "child's skull" which was not in fact human remains at all, as you knew or ought to have known by June 2008.
- 5.2.29 f) To ensure that an appropriate media strategy was in place and being adhered to following the 'find' on 23 February 2008.
- 5.2.30 g) To provide strategic oversight of the SoJP media policy, following receipt of forensic opinion that Exhibit JAR/6 was not human bone, as previously portrayed.
- 5.2.31 h) To ensure that earlier SOJP press releases were corrected following receipt of forensic opinion that Exhibit JAR/6 was not human bone.
- 5.2.32 i) To supervise the SIO, DCO HARPER in relation the content of his media releases following receipt of forensic opinion that Exhibit JAR/6 was not human bone.
- 5.2.33 6. In relation to community impact and confidence you failed as follows:
- 5.2.34 a) To ensure that the community impact assessment or risk assessment of likely community reaction was properly implemented, performed in a timely fashion and periodically reviewed by you. This failure contributed significantly to the undermining of public confidence in the investigation.
- 5.2.35 b) To appoint an Independent Advisory Group ('IAG'), until advised by the ACPO Homicide Working Group to do so.
- 5.2.36 c) To ensure that the IAG was properly constituted, briefed, given appropriate Terms of Reference, advised, guided and utilised by Operation Rectangle.

- 5.2.37 d) To ensure that the investigation was made part of a multi-agency approach thereby maximising public confidence in the investigation.
- 5.2.38 7. In relation to the financial management of Operation Rectangle you failed to establish efficient and effective oversight of financial expenditure prior to the commencement of the Financial Oversight Board in July 2008.
- 5.2.39 8. By reason of the matters aforesaid you presided over but did not manage, supervise or control an investigation which ran out of control, and damaged the reputation of the SoJ.

5.3 Additional suggested charge

- 5.3.1 9. As Chief Officer of Police for the States of Jersey Police ("SoJP") during the currency of the high profile Operation Rectangle you sent emails on 23rd February and 29th February 2008 which emails you knew or ought reasonably to have known were offensive and/or likely to bring discredit upon the SoJP.

5.4 Particulars

- 5.4.1 1. At 22.12 hours on 23rd February 2008 you sent an email to DCO HARPER, OFFICER X and X which was, particularly having regard to its political context, inappropriate, sarcastic and unprofessional.
- 5.4.2 2. At 15.11 hours on 29th February 2009 you sent an email to "W" which was deeply inappropriate in that it contained the following "joke": *"What is the difference between a Jersey royal and a Jersey orphan? Answer: A Jersey Royal gets to be dug up after three months"*.

Appendix 1 – Finance Policy Book entries

Exhibit	Policy File	Decision No.	Date and Time	Officer making decision	Decision	Reasoning
X234	Finance	1	01 October 2007 08:00:00	HARPER	All expenditure to be monitored to ensure maximum OP effectiveness and financial accountability. All O/T to be approved by DS in advance.	In light of the different arrangements for Police budgets to UK, emphasis has to be on limiting spending to that which is operationally necessary to attain objectives of the enquiry.
X234	Finance	2	25 November 2007 10:00:00	HARPER	With UK officers/specialist investigators now being employed necessary accommodation costs will be incurred. Such costs to be approved by me. Home-Jersey fares approved by DS/DI.	To control costs of necessary expenditure and to ensure effective and accountable enquiry.
X234	Finance	3	01 December 2007 10:00:00	HARPER	All expenditure to £1000 (excl. accom) to be authorised by DI. Over that to me.	Ensure accountability and maximum effectiveness.
X234	Finance	4	16 December 2007 12:00:00	HARPER	In light of decision re HDLG and employment of UK specialist Forensic Anthropologists and Archaeologists, numbers and deployment to be decided by scene coordinator in consultation with SIO.	To ensure accountability and effective management to obtain successful outcome.

Appendix 1

Highly Confidential – Personal Information

X234	Finance	5	26 February 2008 15:00:00	HARPER	In the light of the extension to staffing, developments in enquiry and likely future demands, <u>ALL</u> expenditure incurred forthwith to be done so in accordance with attached document.	To ensure sound financial management whilst not interfering with operational necessity.
X234	Finance	6	30 March 2008 10:00:00	HARPER	To move Enquiry and Holmes teams to new purpose built MIR in Broadcasting House which will require to be fitted and furnished.	Current accommodation not sufficient and lacks security. Enquiry teams remote from team leaders and MIR team. Not enough work stations for Enquiry Team and they are having to "Hot Desk". This causing delays and inefficiency. The solution above will resolve these problems, incld security. Also return of MIR to operational use will provide the resilience for the force should another major Enquiry/Homicide occur.

Appendix 2 - Summary of DCO HARPER's purchase card and transaction log Operation Rectangle January to July 2008

Key

	London
	Jersey
	Other or U/K

Below information was extracted from X737

Date	Day	Supplier	Description	Business Unit	Signed off by	Net Invoice Amount
10/01/2008	Thu	Shepherds	Business Dinner and hospitality UK offs	DPP294	OFFICER X	£191.25
11/01/2008	Fri	Marriott Hotels	Hotel accommodation/business meet	DPP294	OFFICER X	£187.71
13/01/2008	Sun	Little Italy	Business dinner UK visitors	DPP294	OFFICER X	£87.90
14/01/2008	Mon	Grand Hotel	Hospitality UK visitors	DPP294	OFFICER X	£14.00
14/01/2008	Mon	La Taverne	Business Dinner UK visitors	DPP294	OFFICER X	£98.60
16/01/2008	Wed	Marriott Hotels	Accommodation and business meeting	DPP294	OFFICER X	£447.00
16/01/2008	Wed	Marriott Hotels	Refs for victims/witness UK	DPP294	OFFICER X	£29.25
16/01/2008	Wed	Atlantic Hotel Newquay	Visit to UK - accommodation	DPP294	OFFICER X	£50.00

Appendix 2

Highly Confidential – Personal Information

Date	Day	Supplier	Description	Business Unit	Signed off by	Net Invoice Amount
17/01/2008	Thu	Little Italy	Business dinner and hospitality UK offs	DPP294	OFFICER X	£109.95
17/01/2008	Thu	Atlantic Hotel Newquay	Dinner - cheque attached for alcohol	DPP294	OFFICER X	£21.32
03/02/2008	Sun	Bombay Brasserie	Dinner for self, X, X, and UK offs	DPP294	OFFICER X	£106.45
04/02/2008	Mon	Shepherds	Business dinner and hospitality UK	DPP294	OFFICER X	£279.00
05/02/2008	Tue	Shepherds London	Meals for SoJP officers in UK and MPS officers + hospitality	DPP294	OFFICER X	£300.00
08/02/2008	Fri	Grand Hotel	Lunch for visiting officer adviser	DPP294	OFFICER X	£28.00
08/02/2008	Fri	La Taverne	Dinner for visiting UK officers re rectangle	DPP294	OFFICER X	£93.50
07/02/2008	Thu	Marriott London	Hotel accommodation London from 03/02/08 to 06/02/08	DPP294	OFFICER X	£672.62
09/02/2008	Sat	L'Horizon Jersey	Lunch for visiting UK Officers + self	DPP294	OFFICER X	£17.00
25/02/2008	Mon	Grand Hotel	Dinner for 2 UK visitors + refs	DPP294	OFFICER X	£53.00
29/02/2008	Fri	L'Horizon Hotel	Hospitality for visiting UK re rectangle	DPP294	OFFICER X	£39.20
01/03/2008	Sat	Atlantic Hotel	Dinner for visiting UK specialists Rectangle	DPP294	OFFICER X	£367.10


Date	Day	Supplier	Description	Business Unit	Signed off by	Net Invoice Amount
05/03/2008	Wed	Mermaid Tavern Restaurant	Dinner for 1 UK specialist and hospitality for others	DPP294	OFFICER X	£86.00
07/03/2008	Fri	Grand Hotel	Hospitality to visiting ACPO officers	DPP294	OFFICER X	£39.45
07/03/2008	Fri	Hotel de France	Dinner for visiting ACPO officers	DPP294	OFFICER X	£226.95
12/03/2008	Wed	Atlantic Hotel	Business dinner - visiting ACPO officers	DPP294	OFFICER X	£327.40
14/03/2008	Fri	Marriott	Hotel Accommodation UK	DPP294	OFFICER X	£156.27
25/03/2008	Tue	Prego	Dinner for UK + SoJP officers	DPP294	OFFICER X	£215.00
25/03/2008	Tue	Grand Hotel	Hospitality for UK Officers	DPP294	OFFICER X	£28.35
26/03/2008	Wed	Mermaid Tavern	Meal for UK Specialist	DPP294	OFFICER X	£20.00
08/04/2008	Thu	Shepherds	Dinner for self + UK officers	DPP294	OFFICER X	£111.94
08/04/2008	Tue	La Taverne	Dinner for Strathclyde police officers	DPP294	OFFICER X	£177.60
18/04/2008	Fri	Bon Vivour	Meal for UK specialist staff	DPP294	OFFICER X	£37.65
23/04/2008	Wed	The Brasserie	Lunch for UK visitors	DPP294	OFFICER X	£57.50

Appendix 2

Highly Confidential – Personal Information

Date	Day	Supplier	Description	Business Unit	Signed off by	Net Invoice Amount
30/04/2008	Wed	Bombay Brasserie	Dinner in UK for self and UK officers	DPP294	OFFICER X	£75.00
01/05/2008	Thu	Shepherds	Dinner in UK for self, SoJP officers + NSY Officers	DPP294	OFFICER X	£233.00
02/05/2008	Fri	Marriott	Hotel + Dinner 30/04 - 02/05	DPP294	OFFICER X	£406.10
20/05/2008	Tue	Hilton Hotel	Hotel Isle of Man Island Forum	DPP294	OFFICER X	£94.40
23/05/2008	Fri	Thistle Hotel	Hotel Accommodation x 2	DPP294	OFFICER X	£130.70
30/05/2008	Fri	Bon Vivour	Dinner for self and 3 UK specialists	DPP294	OFFICER X	£160.00
28/06/2008	Sat	Dorans Courtyard Bistro	Business dinner for ACPO forensic review team x 8 and SoJP x3	DPP294	OFFICER X	£356.70
14/07/2008	Mon	Bombay Brasserie	N/K	C/C Statement	X	£271.60
15/07/2008	Tue	Shepherds	N/K	C/C Statement	X	£160.00
23/07/2008	Wed	Bon Vivour	N/K	C/C Statement	X	£132.50
31/07/2008	Thu	Radisson Jersey	N/K	C/C Statement	X	£42.15
04/08/2008	Mon	Shepherd's	N/K	C/C Statement	X	£200.00
Total						£6,939.11

Appendix 3 – Cumulative Police Expenditure, Operation Rectangle



Appendix 4

Witness List

**Pages 105 – 107
TEXT REDACTED**

Acronym	In Full
HWG	Homicide Working Group
KPMG	A global network of professional services firms providing audit, tax and advisory services
MIM	Murder Investigation Manual
MIRSAP	Major Incident Room Standard Administrative Procedures
MOFM	Monthly Operational Finance Meeting
NPIA	National Policing Improvement Agency
PC	Police Constable
PS	Police Sergeant
SCG	Strategic Co-ordinating Group
SIO	Senior Investigating Officer
SoJP	States of Jersey Police
VFM	Value for Money