

Darya Dolzikova

Research Fellow, Proliferation and Nuclear Policy

# Introduction to Proliferation Financing

Jersey, 23 February 2023





## Outline

- Defining Proliferation Financing
- International Standards and Obligations on CPF








#### FATF definition (2010):


The act of providing funds or financial services that are used, in whole or in part, for the manufacture, acquisition, possession, development, export, trans-shipment, brokering, transport, transfer, stockpiling or use of nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and their means of delivery and related materials.







PF is so much more that the exchange of funds for WMD...





#### Trade in Proliferation-Sensitive Goods and Technologies

- PF activities in this category may include payments for:
  - Procurement of dual-use or proliferation-sensitive goods/technology/components (or belowthreshold);
  - Sourcing of raw materials for WMD;
  - Sourcing of technological expertise relevant to WMD.

RISK: Countries may be exposed if they host nuclear programmes (military or civilian), nuclear research reactors/facilities, or industries that produce or use dual-use, proliferation-sensitive or high-tech goods.



#### **Revenue-Raising Activities**

- Activities that fall into this category can be both inherently <u>illicit</u> or otherwise <u>licit</u> (outside the North Korean context).
- Activities in this category may include:



RISK: Countries with historical and/or political ties to North Korea (e.g., diplomatic relations) may be at a higher risk. Countries that host certain industries or resources that may be of interest to North Korea for fundraising.



### **Financial and Corporate Infrastructures**


- Activities in this category may resemble and rely on other forms of financial crime and may include:
  - Exploitation of corporate services providers (e.g., shell/front companies)
  - Use of local banks to access the financial system vs. international banks to move funds
  - Use of diplomats and embassies to access bank accounts abroad
  - Use of third country financial institutions
  - Use of joint ventures and use of third country intermediaries
  - Bulk cash/gold smuggling and barter systems
  - Aliases and other falsification of corporate and financial documents
  - Targeting regions/institutions with weak monitoring and oversight (regulatory arbitrage)

RISK: Countries may be exposed if they are perceived as having poor corporate transparency, or weak monitoring and oversight of financial institutions or corporate service providers.



There is some cross-over between ML, TF and PF typologies, as well as in the measures governments and businesses can take to counter them.

However, there are key differences and counter-measures need to be tailored.





International Obligations and Standards on CPF



### **UNSC Obligations on Countering PF**

- UN Security Council Resolution 1540 PF References
  - Requires member states to prevent PF by non-state actors (OP 2)
  - Requires members states to prevent the provision of funds/services that support proliferation-related exports (OP 3d)
- Country-specific regimes include PF-related obligations
  - Targeted Financial Sanctions
    - Freeze funds and assets without delay of entities engaging in or supporting proliferation activity; or those acting on their behalf, owned or controlled by them, or assisting them)
  - Other Financial Prohibitions
    - Controls on financial institutions, prohibitions on financial support, controls on diplomats, controls on vessels and aircraft, controls on joint ventures, prohibitions on transfers of gold and cash)
  - Activity-based Prohibitions
    - Trade in certain goods and revenue-generating activities



#### **FATF Standards on Countering PF**

- The intention is that countries will introduce appropriate legislation and pass down expectations to financial institutions and DNFBPs in their jurisdiction.
- **Recommendation 1:** Requires countries to identify, assess, and understand their PF risks, take commensurate action to mitigate these risks, and require FIs and DNFBPs to do the same.
- **Recommendation 2:** Requires effective national cooperation and coordination mechanisms to combat PF.
- Recommendation 7: Requires implementation of UNSCR TFSs on PF (i.e. asset freezes).
- Recommendation 15: Requires VASPs to be regulated for AML/CFT purposes
- Immediate Outcome 1: Actions are coordinated domestically to counter PF.
- Immediate Outcome 11: Requires preventing persons and entities involved in WMD proliferation from raising, moving & using funds.